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The Construction of the Canonical  
History of Financial Economics
Franck Jovanovic
Only recently have economists turned their attention to the history of 
financial economics; indeed, the earliest studies date from just the middle 
of the last decade. By and large, the evolution of financial economics 
has been presented as one of linear progress. However, Jovanovic 2002 
explains that the development of the subdiscipline was anything but linear, 
as one would see by examining the actual historical record. Moreover, 
Jovanovic 2003b shows that construing the story of financial economics 
as one of linear progress is inconsistent with much historical data1—data 
that renders the linear-progress story false. This article deals with that 
problem. It has two major goals.
The first is to explain the origin of the linear-progress story with respect 
to the purported history of financial economics that economists have typi-
cally told. This article suggests that the mismatch between the typical pre-
sentation and the historical data has arisen because most commentators 
have drawn on the canonical history of financial economics—a history 
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1. In accordance with the historical approach, I distinguish historical data from historical 
facts. Historical data are the primary pieces of evidence, or of the historical record, which 
come from archeology, testimonies, and archives. Historians use historical data to construct 
historical facts.
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2. A canon is a privileged set of texts whose interpretation and reinterpretation define the 
background of a discipline.
3. It seems important to differentiate financial economics, which is identified here as the 
subdiscipline, from mathematical finance, which can be identified as mathematics applied 
to finance, and financial econometrics, which can be considered as econometrics applied to 
financial data.
that draws on too narrow a range of sources. This article highlights that 
point by analyzing how and why the canonical history was elaborated. 
A canonical history can be defined as a history created from a canon of 
texts2—that is, from a selection of texts—without recourse to other histori-
cal data. In other words, such a history orders selected theoretical texts 
chronologically and then creates between the texts ex-post links that 
explain the chronology. However, those links are neither historical assump-
tions nor historical results; they are invented stories of the past. This arti-
cle shows that the canonical history of financial economics was created 
during the 1960s to support theoretical viewpoints, theoretical viewpoints 
that led the mainstream community of scientists to recognize financial 
economics as a science.
The second goal is to analyze the introduction of financial economics3 
into economics during the 1960s, and therefore its acceptance as a scien-
tific subdiscipline. This point has never been studied: the canonical his-
tory of financial economics and the traditional presentation that followed 
do not examine this introduction, nor refer to it at all. Indeed, they suppose 
that financial economics had existed since the first theoretical or empirical 
works were published. Therefore, many questions remain unanswered. 
This article focuses on the 1960s, a crucial decade in the construction 
of the subdiscipline: although works in financial economics had existed 
since the mid-nineteenth century, the subdiscipline was only brought into 
science during the 1960s. The concept of a scientific field is useful for 
analyzing the creation of that subdiscipline. According to Bourdieu (2004, 
33), who introduced the concept, a scientific field is “a structured field of 
forces, and also a field of struggles to conserve or transform this field of 
forces.” Through their relationships, individuals create the very space (i.e., 
the structure of the field) that determines them, thanks to the forces that 
are exerted on scientific production and scientific practices. Moreover, 
each scientific discipline or subdiscipline imposes its own rules, behav-
iors, methods, etc., to distinguish itself from other scientific disciplines 
and from approaches recognized as nonscientific. Relying on Gingras, 
Bourdieu (2004, 50) identifies two steps within the development of a sci-
entific field: “First, the emergence of a research practice, in other words, 
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4. Jovanovic (2006) and Jovanovic and Le Gall (2001) analyze Regnault’s work. A biogra-
phy of Regnault is available in Jovanovic 2006.
agents whose practice is based more on research than on teaching, and the 
institutionalization of research in universities through the creation of con-
ditions conducive to the production of knowledge and the long-term repro-
duction of the group; and, secondly, the constitution of a group recognized 
as socially distinct and a social identity, either disciplinary, through the 
creation of scientific associations, or professional, with the creation of a 
corporation—the scientists provide themselves with official representa-
tives to give them social visibility and defend their interest.”
The concept of a scientific field helps us to better understand financial 
economics and its creation. When creating a new scientific subdiscipline, 
the creators must accept that the new subfield will have to fight against the 
structure of the existing larger field as they struggle to promote and estab-
lish their new results, concepts, hypotheses, theories, etc. In other words, 
when it is created, the new scientific subdiscipline cannot be independent 
from the existing structure: it must be created with and against the exist-
ing field of forces, results, etc. This article will focus on one particular 
point that shows the integration of financial economics into science: the 
theoretical explanation. Financial economics became a scientific subdisci-
pline as a consequence of the theoretical explanations given to empirical 
and statistical results accumulated during several decades. Indeed, follow-
ing Bourdieu (1975, 96), “we have to distinguish the [scientist] who has 
discovered the unknown phenomenon from the one who made it a new 
scientific fact integrating it in a theoretical construction” of a scientific 
discipline, which accordingly places it within science. For instance, dur-
ing the 1960s, the random character of stock market prices became a sci-
entific fact about one hundred years after its discovery by Jules Regnault 
in 1863.4 The same is true for the portfolio selection model, developed by 
Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952), which also became a scientific fact dur-
ing the 1960s by receiving a theoretical explanation. More generally, it 
was consistently during the 1960s that many discoveries by financial 
economists became scientific facts. It was also during that decade that a 
canonical history of the subdiscipline emerged to support the new theo-
retical explanations.
The integration of financial economics into science was made possible 
by the synthesis of results. These results belong to three analytical compo-
nents that were developed successively: financial econometrics, the mod-
ern probability theory, and economic equilibrium. Efficient market theory, 
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CAPM, and Modigliani-Miller theorems played a key role in this synthe-
sis, and therefore in the rise of financial economics. They established links 
between, on the one hand, empirical and mathematical results in finance, 
and on the other hand, economic equilibrium. These links led to the cre-
ation of theoretical explanations for empirical results, explanations that 
were the last step in the categorization of financial economics as a scien-
tific subdiscipline. This article focuses on efficient market theory. How-
ever, results presented here can be generalized for all subjects analyzed by 
financial economics for CAPM or Modigliani and Miller’s article (Jovano-
vic 2007).
Part 1 examines the incorporation of this new subdiscipline into science 
during the 1960s, in particular its position toward the existing approach 
and economics. This first part shows that the organization of financial eco-
nomics as a scientific subdiscipline was only made during the 1960s.
Part 2 analyzes the internal organization of financial economics dur-
ing the 1960s to show how the subdiscipline was structured as a scientific 
field. It explains that two theoretical viewpoints existed and that they led 
to the creation of two canonical histories to support them.
1. The Creation of Financial Economics:  
The Integration of Theoretical Hypotheses  
and Empirical Results into the Scientific Field
Before the 1960s, works in financial economics were very marginal in 
the scientific field. Milton Friedman’s reaction against Harry Markowitz’s 
PhD thesis gives a good illustration. The thesis, defended in 1952, deals 
with the theory of portfolio selection. It is one of the first Anglo-American 
works in what it is now called financial economics that was not exclusively 
empirical. In the defense, Friedman declared: “Harry, I don’t see anything 
wrong with the math here, but I have a problem. This isn’t a dissertation in 
economics, and we can’t give you a Ph.D. in economics for a dissertation 
that’s not economics. It’s not math, it’s not economics, it’s not even busi-
ness administration” (Bernstein 1992, 60).
While Friedman’s reaction could be considered inappropriate or exces-
sive, given the importance of Markowitz’s work today, it is understandable 
in the light of Markowitz’s contribution in his 1952 article. That article 
used mathematical properties of random variables to show that the diver-
sification of shares from a portfolio could reduce the variability of returns: 
the expected value of a weighted sum is the weighted sum of the expected 
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5. Obviously, this situation completely changed with the publication of Markowitz’s book 
in 1959, which gives a theoretical explanation to his model.
6. Among them were John Bauer, Eugene Fama, Benjamin King, Arnold Larson, Sydney 
Levine, Jacob Michaelson, Arnold Moore, William Sharpe, William Steiger, and Alan Wright.
values, while the variance of a weighted sum is not the weighted sum of 
the variances. Markowitz did not give any theoretical demonstration of his 
mathematical result; he merely provided a financial interpretation of some 
mathematical properties.5 Therefore, Friedman’s reaction is a good signal 
about the situation of financial economics before the 1960s, and more 
specifically before Modigliani and Miller’s contribution in 1958: the few 
existing works did not constitute either an academic or a scientific disci-
pline yet; there were applied mathematics and empirical investigations, 
but these were isolated contributions, and they lacked a solid theoretical 
underpinning. This situation changed with the creation and the organiza-
tion of a new community during the 1960s.
This first part shows that financial economics became a science during 
the 1960s. It analyzes two developments: first, the construction of a new 
scientific community, which had two main groups of researchers; second, 
the integration of this community into science, thanks to economics.
1.1. The Rise of a New Scientific Community
Three features point out the rise of a new scientific community: first, the 
creation of groups of researchers; second, a common training; and third, 
the affirmation of a specific method.
The creation of a community with two main groups of researchers. At the 
beginning of the 1960s, a new generation of economists started their grad-
uate studies and contributed to the creation of financial economics.6 Stud-
ies about financial markets or corporate finance were not new; what was 
new was the manner in which they were studied. One major feature was 
the access to new mathematical tools borrowed from modern probability 
theory. Since the 1950s, modern probability theory was increasingly used 
to study financial markets and corporate finance. At the beginning, econo-
mists and other researchers exploited the properties of random variables. 
Then they used stochastic processes, which probability theory analyzed. 
Before the 1960s, hardly any economist and financier used these pro-
cesses, because they were not well understood and they were not widely 
disseminated. Effectively, the modern probability theory, which mainly 
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7. A sequence of random variables Pt adapted to (Φn; 0 ≤ n ≤ N) is called a martingale if 
E(Pt + 1 / Ö0, Ö1 ,..., Öt) = Pt. This means that the best estimation of the security’s price at time 
t+1, Pt + 1 with the available information at time t, Φt, that we can come up with at time t is the 
security’s price at time t, Pt. Thus the expected profit, y, between two periods, considering the 
available information at time t, Φt, is zero E(yt + 1 / Öt) = 0.
8. Lorie was recruited in 1951 at Chicago specifically to revitalize the Graduate School of 
Business.
9. Fischer Black, whose successor was Myron Scholes, also managed the center. Both 
participated in the elaboration of the option pricing model, which was published in 1973 and 
was mainly developed by researchers from the CRSP and MIT. See Mehrling 2005, chap. 5.
comes from Kolmogorov’s work, received genuinely wide acceptance in 
the 1950s by the new generation of mathematicians (see Mazliak 2003 and 
Chaumont et al. 2004). Even during the 1960s, few economists or finan-
ciers used stochastic processes. For instance, Samuelson (1965a, 1965b), 
who was the first with Mandelbrot (1966) to substitute the martingale 
model7 for the random walk model/Brownian motion to represent stock 
price variations, needed the help of a mathematician to make his math-
ematical demonstration (Samuelson 1965b).
With the use of stochastic processes, in the 1960s the mathematical 
treatment of the random character of stock market variations took on a 
large importance. Most of the academics who innovatively studied finan-
cial markets with modern probability theory during the 1960s and the 
1970s were at the University of Chicago or MIT.
At the University of Chicago, research on the random character of stock 
market prices began at the Graduate School of Business, where Harry 
Roberts worked with James Lorie and Lawrence Fisher. In 1960, the lat-
ter two professors started an ambitious four-year program of research on 
security prices.8 They created the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), which had an important group of PhD students such as Eugene 
Fama, Benjamin King, and Arnold Moore. Merton Miller joined them 
one year later, in 1961.9
At the same time, MIT opened a new area of research on the random 
character of stock market prices with Sidney Alexander, Paul Cootner, 
Dick Eckaus, Hendrik Houthakker (visiting professor), Ed Kuhn, Paul 
Samuelson, and several students, including Walter Barney, John Bauer, 
Sidney Levine, William Steiger, and Richard Kruizenga. During the 1960s, 
Cootner supervised more than twenty theses in financial economics and 
became an essential figure in the development of the subdiscipline at MIT.
The training of the new entrants: the creation of scientific journals and 
seminars and the publication of textbooks. The creation of a new sci-
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10. For instance, Cootner (1964), Fredrikson (1965), Wu and Zakon (1965), Fredrikson 
(1971), and Lorie and Brealey (1972) published collections of articles, while Moore (1968), 
Mao (1969), Jean (1970), and Fama and Miller (1972) published textbooks.
entific community requires that its new members share common tools, 
references, and problems. This was precisely the role of textbooks, semi-
nars, and scientific journals. Those in financial economics were developed 
from the beginning of the 1960s with the arrival of this new generation 
of students. Concerning periodicals, the two journals that had published 
articles in finance, the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Business, 
changed their editorial policy during the 1960s. Both started publishing 
articles based on modern probability theory and on modeling (see Bern-
stein 1992, 41–44, 129). Those two reviews published several special 
issues to reinforce the new orientation and results. In 1966, the Journal 
of Business published a special issue on “recent quantitative and formal 
research on the stock market.” In addition to those two journals, other sci-
entific journals specializing in financial economics were created, such as 
the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis in 1965. In 1968, the 
journal just mentioned published a special issue about the application of 
the random walk model to stock prices.
It was also during the 1960s that textbooks and collections of articles 
started to appear.10 These publications also helped to define and stabilize a 
culture shared by the members of the new community. Given that collec-
tions of articles are published before textbooks, interval between the 
moment when the former were published and the moment when the text-
books were published gives an indication about the evolution of the disci-
pline. Indeed, the diversification of the subjects analyzed and the publica-
tion of textbooks are good indicators with which to identify the period 
when a new scientific subdiscipline is finally accepted. During the 1960s, 
following the publication of Markowitz’s book in 1959, the publications of 
collected articles focused on portfolio selection; it was only at the end of 
the 1960s that textbooks on the subject were published. During the second 
part of the decade, there was a diversification of subjects, which started to 
structure the discipline. In addition to portfolio selection, journal articles 
dealt with the nature of stock price movements, the investment returns, 
market efficiency, and the CAPM or capital asset pricing model. However, 
textbooks on these subjects only first appeared during the 1970s.
In 1964, the first anthology of articles analyzing random stock price 
movements was published: The Random Character of Stock Market 
Prices, edited by Paul Cootner. It has an important place in the history 
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11. See for example the debate between Levy (1967, 1968) and Jensen (1967). See also 
Granger 1970, Hoffland 1967, Shelton 1967, Van Horne and Parker 1968, and Wallich 1968.
of financial economics for three reasons. First, it contributed enormously 
to the spread of the random walk model and its interpretation. Second, it 
sketched a research program for the future that was largely followed. 
Third, the book provided the first presentation of historical data relative 
to financial economics.
The differentiation from existing approaches. The third feature deals 
with the definition of a new field of investigation. The new scholars who 
started to develop financial economics adopted a new strategy to differen-
tiate the new domain of research from previous approaches and to justify 
the usefulness of their new approach. Scholars mentioned above and who 
developed financial economics provide a good illustration of this. Young 
scholars opened several debates comparing the qualities of their new 
approach, mainly based on mathematical models and tools—in particular 
the random walk model—and previous approaches that studied stock price 
changes, in particular chartism and business cycles, such as those defended 
at the NBER. The debates generally took place in specialized journals and 
newspapers, such as Business Week and the Financial Analysts Journal,11 
in which scholars popularized their results. To justify the new approach, 
those in the avant-garde of financial economics presented their arguments 
in Manichean terms, underlining what is scientific and what is not, what 
comes from scholars and what comes from nonscholars. For instance, 
Cootner (1964, 1–2) introduced his book by saying that
these academic studies have proven to be more skeptical about the 
folklore of the market place than those of the professional practitio-
ners. To several of the authors represented in this volume the “pat-
terns” described by some market analysis are mere superstitions. . . . 
it is hard to find a practitioner, no matter how sophisticated, who does 
not believe that by looking at the past history of prices one can learn 
something about their prospective behavior, while it is almost as dif-
ficult to find an academician who believes that such a backward look 
is of any substantial value. The essays in this book are exclusively of 
the academic type.
As did other defenders of the random walk model and the new ideas, Fama 
(1965b, 59) and Archer (1968, 231–32) presented their results as a “chal-
lenge” to professionals—chartists, brokers, financial analysts—in short, all 
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people who work in financial markets and who are distinguished here 
from scholars. The professionals in turn had to justify the usefulness of 
their practices. Finally, Hoffland (1967, 85) provided a good summary of 
the situation:
Folklore is a body of knowledge incorporating the superstitions, beliefs 
and practices of the unsophisticated portion of a society. . . . Folklore 
is distinguished from scientific knowledge by its lack of rigor. . . . The 
Dow theory is often used as an example of a crudely formulated stock 
market “theory.”
As we see, the most important argument was the scientific claim: the new 
financial economists argued that their approach was based on scientific 
criteria, while chartism was based on folklore and had no scientific foun-
dation. Financial economics was supposed support previous folkloric 
practices, and the random walk model was presented as the uniquely avail-
able scientific analysis of the character of stock price changes. The vocab-
ulary used was intentionally clear-cut to convince the reader: “scientific,” 
“folklore,” “challenge.” In addition, academics chose to call the new disci-
pline modern financial theory to insist on its novelty. Chartists and pro-
fessionals were not the only targets. Many financial economists used the 
publication of textbooks as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction 
with the traditional approach. However, after the 1960s, once financial eco-
nomics was permanently embedded in science, the debates disappeared: 
they lost their significance, because the scientific community and many 
financiers permanently recognized and adopted financial economics.
1.2. The Links with Economics through  
the Construction of Efficient Market Theory
The new seminars and publications contributed to the creation of a truly 
homogenous community, which shared common problems, common 
tools, and a common language, as well as scientific journals and courses 
in universities. The use of the theory of modern probability, in particular 
the concept of uncertainty, offered new perspectives on already existing 
problems. At that time, however, such developments were technical and 
theoretical explanations did not exist. In other words, during this period 
the modern probability theory provided new tools that the social sciences 
could exploit, but, obviously, that was not enough to build a new disci-
pline: a model does not contain causalities per se, because the choice 
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12. I consider that the acceptance of a theory or a theoretical model does not only depend 
on empirical validation; there is also the criterion of conventional acceptance. Conventional 
acceptance concerns the conventions—postulates, beliefs, etc.—that a theory (or a model) 
must respect in order to be accepted as a scientific result of a discipline.
13. The Koopmans-Vining debate deeply influenced the economics of the 1950s. On this 
controversy, see Mirowski 1989.
14. See also the remarks of Champernowne, Bartlett, Rao, and Jevons in the discussion 
that follows Kendall’s article.
between endogenous variables and exogenous variables comes from theo-
retical frameworks. Indeed, a theory gives causalities that allow one to 
define the structure of the model. These new tools from modern probabil-
ity theory cannot provide an explanation of the empirical environment. 
Therefore, theoretical frameworks were necessary to introduce financial 
economics into science. More precisely, it was necessary to link the new 
approach with an existing science or with the criteria of conventional 
acceptance12 of that time. The use of the contemporaneous scientific 
method—the tests and the hypothetico-deductive method—already con-
stituted an important link. However, during the 1960s, the crucial step for 
the creation of financial economics was the construction of theoretical 
explanations based on concepts from economics.
The lack of theoretical explanations before the 1960s. Before the 1960s, 
there existed no theory explaining the new results in portfolio selection 
or in the random character of stock market prices. This crucial point 
illustrates what kept financial economics from becoming a scientific 
subdiscipline. The absence of theory characterizes all existing works 
written during that transitional period (see Jovanovic 2007).
Neither Cowles (1933), Working (1934), nor Kendall (1953), who were 
the first Anglo-Americans to analyze the random character of stock prices, 
created any theory to explain the phenomenon. Indeed, the enthusiasm 
for the new econometric practices developed since the 1930s clouded 
the research for theoretical explanations of the random character of stock 
prices. Theoreticians pointed out the absence of theoretical explana-
tions during the 1950s. This was particularly striking after the Koopmans-
Vining debate at the end the 1940s, which set the NBER against the Cowles 
Commission over the lack of theoretical explanations and the need to link 
measurement with theory.13 For instance, when Maurice Kendall published 
his statistical study on random price fluctuations in 1953, it was accepted 
with interest even as its economic contribution was harshly criticized. The 
most important critique was the absence of links with economic theories 
or concepts (Houthakker 1953, 32; Prais 1953, 29).14
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15. Although Modigliani and Miller were not the first to apply the arbitrage proof in finance 
(Rubinstein 2003), their article led to its popularity for two reasons: (1) their article was one of 
the first to use modern probability theory to analyze a financial problem; and (2) the authors 
were members of strong academic departments (MIT and the University of Chicago).
These kind of debates among economists had a direct influence on the 
two main defenders of the random character of prices at that time, Work-
ing (1956, 1958, 1961) and Roberts (1959), who also consistently high-
lighted the absence of theoretical explanations and the weakness of the 
statistical results. For instance, Roberts (1959, 9) pointed out that the inde-
pendence of the variations—one of the two aspects of the random walk 
model with the distribution function—was still not established. Working 
(1956, 1436) underlined that there was no true verification of the random 
character of stock price variations and added that it was impossible to 
reject the chartist analysis with certainty. These remarks were very impor-
tant because, at the end of the 1950s, there were very few authors who had 
published on the subject.
The random walk caught up with economics. Theoretical explanations 
finally came during the 1960s when empirical and mathematical results 
were linked with economic equilibrium. Although they recognized the 
absence of theoretical explanations for the random character of stock price 
fluctuations, Working and Roberts were also the first to make links with 
economic theories in order to give theoretical foundations to empirical 
observations. Roberts (1959, 7) used the “arbitrage proof” argument, which 
is an extension of the economic law of one price in perfect capital mar-
kets: the forces of competition will ensure that any given commodity will 
be sold at the same price. Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, one of 
Roberts’s colleagues in Chicago, popularized this argument in their article 
published in 1958.15 The argument forged a first link between economics 
and financial results: their demonstrations are an implication of equilib-
rium in a perfect capital market, which provides a direct link with economic 
equilibrium. Roberts used it for the same aim: to create a link between 
economic concepts and the random walk model. On the other hand, Work-
ing (1956) established an explicit link between the unpredictable arrival 
of information and the random character of stock price changes. Another 
important step was the identification of a link between financial econo-
metric results and the equilibrium from economics made by Cowles (1960, 
914–15). By making a first reference to a competitive market, this article 
constituted the beginning of a connection with the standard economic 
theory that progressively led to an elaboration of the efficient market 
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16. This is a property of the random walk model, which is a Markov process.
theory. And, two years later, Cootner (1962, 25) presented the idea of the 
efficient market theory, although he did not use that expression. Indeed, he 
suggested linking the random walk model, information, and economic 
equilibrium.
Several of his students took up and promoted his suggestion. It also 
interested researchers at the University of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business, most notably a young graduate student, Eugene Fama. In his 
PhD thesis, defended in 1964 and published the next year in the Journal 
of Business, Fama synthesized empirical work and gave his first formu-
lation of the efficient market theory. He formulated the definition of the 
efficient market that is generally used in his 1970 article: “a market in 
which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘effi-
cient’” (1970, 383). According to the efficient market theory, if the model 
of equilibrium does not use all available information to evaluate the value 
of a security, it will be possible to make an arbitrage. Thus, in an efficient 
market, the equalization between the price and the equilibrium value means 
that all available information is included in the price. Consequently, it is 
not possible to use past information to predict the future changes of the 
prices: present and future prices are independent from the past prices.16 
For this reason, in an efficient market, stock price changes must be as 
random as the arrival of new information. In other words, according to 
this theory, the random walk model can simulate the dynamic evolution 
of equilibrium prices in a competitive market. As a result of this link with 
economic equilibrium, the efficient market hypothesis, as well as portfolio 
selection and arbitrage proof (Jovanovic 2007), allowed the introduction 
of financial economics into science.
2. The Internal Organization  
of the New Discipline
The first part of this essay examined the integration of financial econom-
ics into science. The second part will analyze the internal organization—
the positions and relationships in the subfield—of the new subdiscipline. 
We have seen that, during the 1960s, several theoretical links were made 
between the random walk model and economic concepts and theories. 
Although the links could give a theoretical explanation to the random 
character of stock prices, the explanation was not unique. This second part 
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17. The normal backwardation is a fee paid by a seller of a security to the buyer for the 
privilege of deferring delivery. It implies that a risk premium exists so that futures prices fall 
short of the expected future spot price.
shows that two theoretical viewpoints coexisted: the first contended that 
financial markets are perfect markets and that stock prices follow a pure 
random walk, and the second that financial markets are not perfect and 
that stock prices do not follow a pure random walk. Roughly, the Univer-
sity of Chicago Graduate School of Business defended the first position, 
while MIT defended the second. These two viewpoints structured the new 
subfield. They also directly influenced empirical investigations conducted 
during the 1960s and led to the creation of two canonical histories of 
financial economics.
2.1. The Defense of Two Theoretical Viewpoints
Two theoretical viewpoints. As I explained above, Cootner (1962) was one 
of the first to sketch the efficient market theory. However, after his sugges-
tion to link the random movements of stock prices with the idea of perfect 
stock markets, Cootner (1962, 25–26) added:
Where else can the economist find that ideal of his—the perfect mar-
ket? Here is a place to take a stand, if there is such a place. Unfortu-
nately, it is not the right place. The stock market is not a random walk. 
A growing number of investigators have begun to suspect it, and I think 
I have enough evidence to demonstrate the nature of the imperfections. 
On the other hand, I do not believe that the market is grossly imperfect. 
In fact, I do not know why the process I see going on in the market is 
not worthy of the name perfection too. It strays from “perfection” only 
to the extent that it defines the Frank Knight–Milton Friedman assump-
tion of profitless speculation. Even more interesting, perhaps, is that my 
model is perfectly compatible with much of what I interpret Wall Street 
chart reading to be all about.
Cootner’s position gives a clear illustration of the MIT position: stock 
markets are not perfect. Moreover, theoreticians at MIT defended Keynes-
ian considerations, in particular the Keynesian “normal backwardation” 
of commodity prices,17 which is not completely relevant to the markets’ 
perfection. In 1960, Cootner answered Lester Telser, a young scholar at 
the University of Chicago, about the possibility of a perfect stock market. 
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18. Samuelson also justified the introduction of the martingale model with the normal 
backwardation: he criticized the most restrictive properties of the random walk model, which 
precisely cannot explain “the alleged Keynes-Hicks-Houthakker-Cootner pattern of ‘normal 
backwardation,’” or “the Cootner pattern” (Samuelson 1965a, 41). 
19. Note that the increase of prices according to √T, where T is time, is a consequence of 
the independence of the stochastic process. Samuelson (1982, 108–10) gives a mathematical 
interpretation of Cootner’s model.
Telser expressed Knightian doubts about Keynes’s normal backwarda-
tion. Telser used the no-arbitrage opportunity to suggest that there would 
be no difference between the price of futures and the spot price expected 
upon expiration of that contract, and that futures would give an unbiased 
estimate of such expected prices (Cootner 1960, 397). In this case, stock 
markets would be perfect, a position Cootner criticized.18
The idea that stock markets are not perfect also influenced Cootner’s 
conception of the random character of stock prices. He suggested that 
prices behave as a constrained random walk within “reflecting barriers.” 
He assumed that “when prices neared the barrier there would be a ten-
dency for some negative autocorrelation, since movements to the barrier 
would be more likely to be followed by movements in the opposite direc-
tion” (1962, 28). The following year, his constrained random-walk model 
was validated empirically by one of his students, William Steiger. Coot-
ner’s model was supported by Samuelson (1982, 114), who explained, “I 
believe Paul Cootner was right to doubt that the speculative price of a 
stock, bond, grain futures, grain physical, machine tool, or acre of per-
petual land would wander endlessly (like √T ) away from its rendezvous 
with its equilibrium dictated by economic law. His reflecting barriers were 
a valiant attempt to evade the unacceptable.”19 MIT’s position on the 
imperfection of the stock markets was also shared by Working. Starting at 
the end of the 1950s, Working began to develop a theoretical explanation 
of the more or less random character of stock prices. He arranged short-
time movements of stock prices into two categories (1956, 1431). The first 
one includes movements related to pertinent new market information. 
This category is divided into three subcategories, according to whether the 
price movement was (1) exactly appropriate, in size and direction, to the 
new information that induced it; (2) larger than the new information war-
ranted; or (3) smaller than the new information warranted. The second 
category is divided into two subcategories, according to whether the move-
ment was (1) unrelated to any pertinent economic information; or (2) cor-
rective, tending to eliminate existing price maladjustment. In another arti-
cle, Working (1958, 192) added:
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[The “perfect market”] assumption would impair the usefulness of our 
model because it would eliminate the differences of opinion that are the 
source of much trading in a real market. To provide for differences of 
opinion, it is necessary only to specify that the traders are human rather 
than superhuman in their mental capacity.
Finally, for Working as well as for MIT, stock markets are imperfect.
These positions were vastly different from those defended at the Uni-
versity of Chicago Graduate School of Business. One of the starting points 
of the CRSP was the defense of the random walk model, and Fama was 
“the most energetic and prolific randomist” (Lorie 1965, 17). As we saw 
above, they claimed that stock markets are perfect, and characterized 
them as efficient. To demonstrate this, they considered that financial mar-
kets are perfect and that they reflect the competitive market of economics 
with rational agents. Fama gave the first theoretical demonstration in his 
thesis. He considers two kinds of agents: on one hand, “sophisticated trad-
ers,” who are the only fundamentalists and chartists able to determine the 
intrinsic value of securities; on the other hand, other participants who 
do not have this skill and who are responsible for the “noise” in stock 
markets. “Thus these two types of sophisticated traders [fundamentalists 
and chartists] can be roughly thought of as superior intrinsic-value ana-
lysts and superior chart readers. We further assume that, although there 
are sometimes discrepancies between actual prices and intrinsic values, 
sophisticated traders in general feel that actual prices usually tend to 
move toward intrinsic values” (1965a, 37–38). “Sophisticated traders,” 
due to their skills, make a better evaluation of the intrinsic values than 
other agents do. The major feature here is the existence of a homoge-
neous group that shares the same intrinsic values—this group can be for 
instance institutional funds. To have an equalization between intrinsic 
values and prices, Fama adds another hypothesis: it is necessary that the 
financial resources of the “sophisticated traders” be superior to those of 
other agents (40). Because the “sophisticated traders” have the majority 
of financial resources and share the same intrinsic values, their actions 
lead to prices equaling the intrinsic values they share as well as to any 
consistent profit being erased. Therefore, according to Fama, no bubbles 
can arise, because “sophisticated traders” “may cause the ‘bubbles’ to 
burst before they have a chance to really get under way” (38). In the same 
way, these traders should guarantee independence in the arrival of new 
information (39). Finally, “the stock market may conform to the indepen-
dence assumption of the random walk model even though the processes 
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20. Fama dropped his distinction between sophisticated traders and other traders in his 
1970 article.
21. The first computers were created in the 1930s, but did not become common in aca-
demic research laboratories until the 1960s; see Metropolis, Howlett, and Rota 1980.
22. Cowles and Jones (1937) obtained statistical correlations for monthly or weekly aver-
ages of daily stock prices. Working (1960) explains that the use of averages can introduce 
correlations not present in the original series.
23. Houthakker (1961, 168) also showed that the normal law is not verified because the 
distribution of the time-series is much more leptokurtic.
generating noise and new information are themselves dependant” (39).20 
Therefore, no trader can make a profit.
The intensification of research in financial econometrics. Beginning in 
the 1960s, researchers began using computers,21 which increased the num-
ber of investigations using empirical data. However, contrary to what the 
traditional history generally presents, empirical results obtained during 
this period were not homogeneous: empirical investigations on stock price 
variations completely depended on the two theoretical viewpoints identi-
fied above.
At MIT, economists aimed to identify correlations in price series or 
to anticipate price variations. They first found support for their convic-
tion that stock markets are not perfect in the initial research on the ran-
dom character of stock price movements. The presence of trends and 
correlations in stock price movements had been noted by Cowles, who 
identified a bias that made it possible to predict fluctuations in the stock 
price of futures. Following a remark made by Working (1960)22 about 
these “pretended trends,” Cowles took once again to the calculus of his 
1960 article: he obtained the same results (Cowles 1960, 914). Kendall 
also found significant correlations, but he minimized them. Alexander 
(1961, 9) wrote of Kendall’s conclusion that
Kendall felt impelled to draw the moral that it is dangerous to gener-
alize even from fairly extensive sets of data. For, from the behavior of 
wheat prices and the stock prices, one might have concluded that 
speculative markets do not generate autocorrelated price changes. . . . 
Alas, Kendall drew the wrong moral. The appropriate one is that if you 
find a single exception, look for an error.
Working from these first results, MIT’s economists also identified system-
atic movements in price variations. Houthakker (1961, 166) analyzed stop 
orders and showed that “price changes are not purely random but follow 
certain longer run trends.” Those trends could be exploited to make profits.23 
HOPE402-01jovanovic.indd   228 1/31/08   8:38:52 AM
Jovanovic / The History of Financial Economics 229
24. Weintraub (1963), Mellon (1964), and Niederhoffer (1965) obtained similar results.
In his 1957 article, he had already shown that “large speculators show 
definite evidence of forecasting skill, both in the long and in the short run” 
(151). In addition, Alexander (1961) reexamined the main results that vali-
date the random walk model. He concluded that trends exist. In 1962, 
Cootner published an extensive study of weekly data on forty-five stocks. 
Essentially, he reported that prices appeared to move randomly when 
studied at one-week intervals. Nevertheless, he also found evidence of 
trends in the same data at fourteen-week intervals.24
At Chicago, economists worked toward a different goal. The CRSP 
wanted to validate the random walk model at any price. It was “the idée 
fixe of the school” (Niederhoffer 1997, 271). As Niederhoffer (1997, 270) 
explains, they were
a team of four of the most respected graduate students in finance [who] 
had joined forces with two professors, now considered venerable enough 
to have won or to have been considered for a Nobel prize, but at that 
time feisty as Hades and insecure as a kid on his first date. This elite 
group was studying the possible impact of volume on stock price move-
ments, a subject I had researched. . . . I could see this Group of Six 
gathered together on a stairway landing, examining some computer 
output. Their voices wafted up to me, echoing off the stone walls of the 
building. One of the students was pointing to some output while query-
ing the professors, “Well, what if we really do find something? We’ll be 
up the creek. It won’t be consistent with the random walk model.” The 
younger professor replied, “Don’t worry, we’ll cross that bridge in the 
unlikely event we come to it.”
This group tested the random character of stock market prices by different 
ways. Moore (1962) was one of the first to examine the serial correlation 
between successive price variations. His results suggested that previous 
price changes could not be used to predict future changes. Fama (1965a) 
studied the daily proportionate price changes of the thirty industrial stocks 
in the Dow Jones. He used several tests and his results supported the ran-
dom walk hypothesis. In addition to these tests, members of the CRSP 
systematically tried to provide countertests against results that identified 
significant price correlations. For instance, following Alexander’s 1961 
results, Fama and Blume (1966) demonstrated that filter schemes cannot, 
in general, provide returns larger than a naive policy of buying and hold-
ing stocks.
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Finally, the community in financial economics organized itself into 
two groups according to two theoretical viewpoints. Each group found 
empirical results to validate their theoretical positions. I will now ana-
lyze how each group elaborated its own canonical history.
2.2. The Two Canonical Histories  
of Financial Economics
The inauguration of financial economics as a science and the organiza-
tion of research in the subdiscipline were accomplished through a par-
ticular manner of presenting the history of the discipline. This manner 
of presentation comes from the construction of the canon of theoretical 
articles, and it is due to the fact that the creation of the canon led to select 
references and particular founding fathers. The canon not only exagger-
ates the importance of a few great men or contributions but simultane-
ously excludes or discredits the noncanonical. It can also link the selected 
contributions with a particular historical presentation and perspective. 
During the 1960s, the creation of a canon of theoretical contributions 
became the basis of a canonical history. I will show, however, that dur-
ing this decade there was not one canonical history of financial econom-
ics but two: each theoretical approach—perfect markets versus imperfect 
markets—created its own unique version to support a particular theoreti-
cal viewpoint.
I must, however, confess that the terminology is not completely satis-
factory. The question is, Did the work of those theoreticians constitute 
genuine history? It is important to clarify that. During the 1960s, when 
canons were elaborated in financial economics, the creation of the canon-
ical history of the subdiscipline was not a goal, but a consequence of the 
way that the canons were made. Therefore, judging their efforts according 
to the method used, the history they created was a history in name only. 
As I explained in the introduction, such “canonical histories” create merely 
an impression of historical analysis: they simply order theoretical contri-
butions chronologically and then link them retrospectively, with perfect 
hindsight. Consequently, such links are neither historical assumptions nor 
historical results; they are invented stories of the past. For these reasons, I 
chose to call this presentation of the past a “canonical history.” 
The selection among references. The growing popularity of modern prob-
ability theory and the stochastic processes led Anglo-American econo-
mists to discover Bachelier’s work on stock prices. A mathematician, Leon-
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25. He discovered Bachelier’s book, Le jeu, la chance, et le hasard, around 1957. It is 
interesting to note that in libraries the book is shelved with the mathematics books. Moreover, 
as Osborne (1959b, 808) explained, Bachelier’s thesis was “rather inaccessible (it is available 
in the Library of Congress rare book room).”
26. Let me be clear that, for the authors, the “modern theory of portfolio management” 
concerned the whole literature in financial economics of that time. Therefore, their book 
contained three parts: “The Behaviour of the Market” (with a section on market efficiency), 
“Portfolio Management,” and the “Valuation of Securities.”
ard Jimmie Savage,25 who worked at the University of Chicago, began 
reading Bachelier’s work at the end of the 1950s, and, “around 1960, 
Haloid (now Xerox) machines in universities across the United States were 
busy running off copies of Bachelier’s 60-year-old dissertation” (Hagin 
and Mader 1973, 61). This discovery led to the acknowledgment of a com-
mon founding father for financial economics. However, Bachelier was the 
only reference shared by the two main groups of researchers; indeed, the 
defense of different theoretical viewpoints led each group to select among 
references.
It can be observed that Cootner (1964) gave priority to MIT’s thesis. 
However, Cootner’s book contained articles that were published at a time 
when few authors dealt with the subject. Therefore, the articles contain 
only a few references, and some none at all. But whereas the paucity of 
references in Cootner may be defensible, the same cannot be said about 
the publications by the Chicago economists. When we compare Fama’s 
articles and the book edited by Cootner, we note that Fama did not men-
tion several references, in particular any thesis defended at MIT. More 
significantly, Fama’s 1970 article does not mention any other references 
published after Cootner’s book: apart from some articles reprinted in 
Cootner, he only referenced articles published by his colleagues at the 
University of Chicago. For instance, there is no mention of works devel-
oped at the University of California (e.g., Kassouf 1968), or of the 1968 
special issue of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis on the 
random walk model. The same tendency can be found in Lorie and Ham-
ilton 1973. In a similar fashion, Lorie and Brealey (1972, viii) explained in 
their preface:
We felt a need for a book of readings that included the most important 
articles in the development of the modern theory of portfolio manage-
ment. After selecting the thirty-seven articles in this book, we were 
surprised to find that almost half of them were in some way associ-
ated with the Center for Research in Security Prices.26
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More precisely, while the references from works completed at the Uni-
versity of Chicago were exhaustive, very few works from elsewhere were 
cited.
Moreover, to stay in harmony with their theoretical viewpoints, Fama, 
Lorie, and Hamilton voluntarily ignored results and articles that did not 
accept the idea of a perfect market—the random walk model and market 
efficiency. For instance, in his article, Fama did not quote several results 
developed at MIT; neither the articles of Theil and Leenders (1965), Nie-
derhoffer (1965), and Shelton (1967), nor the patterns identified by 
Cowles (1944) and Cowles and Jones (1937), were considered. LeRoy 
(1989, 1595) also explained that
Fama’s interpretation of Victor Niederhoffer and M. F. M. Osborne’s 
evidence on runs—successive price changes of the same signs—is dif-
ficult to square with the fair game interpretation. Niederhoffer and 
Osborne found that reversals—pairs of successive price changes of 
opposite sign—occurred two to three times as frequently as continua-
tions. Such systematic patterns are inconsistent with the fair game 
model. Despite this, Fama concluded and emphasized that such patterns, 
even though statistically significant, do no imply market inefficiency.
To be precise, economists at the University of Chicago cited articles that 
contradicted the random character of stock price movements only when 
those articles obtained opposite results with the same kind of tests. In 
the same way, Fama, Lorie, and Hamilton did not mention the attempts 
of Working and Cootner to give theoretical foundations to the random 
walk model.
The choice to ignore works that did not share the same theoretical view-
point had a crucial influence on the construction of the canonical history 
of financial economics.
The canonical history provided by MIT’s theoretical viewpoint. Cootner’s 
book, The Random Character of Stock Market Prices, was not only the 
first anthology of articles that analyzed random stock price movements; it 
was also the first to provide historical data of financial economics. Coot-
ner organized the data according to the theoretical position defended at 
MIT: the imperfection of the stock exchange. His presentation consisted 
of justifying the search for correlations or predictability of stock price 
movements. It suggested a history in three steps: “origins and justification 
of the random walk theory,” “refinement and empirical testing,” and “the 
random walk hypothesis reexamined.”
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For each step, Cootner discusses the place of the papers included, and 
their significance, in the historical development of the subject. He writes:
It is clear, however, that until fairly recently, the study of [speculative] 
prices was the province of the speculator, rather than the academician. 
To be sure, Louis Bachelier pioneered in this study over 60 years ago, 
but his work, about which we will soon learn more, stands as an iso-
lated event. (1964, 1)
While Roberts’ paper gives, at some length, a justification of the assump-
tion that stock prices should have independent increments, Bachelier 
had, some 59 years earlier, developed an elaborate mathematical the-
ory of speculative prices based on that proposition and tested it. . . . 
So outstanding is his work that we can say that the study of specula-
tive prices has its moment of glory at its moment of conception. . . . It 
also marked the beginning of the theory of stochastic processes, a 
beginning which went unrecognized for decades. (1964, 3)
If Bachelier was before his time in the development of probability he 
was even farther ahead in the analysis of stock market prices. It was not 
until 1934 that H. Working revived the idea of random walk in com-
modity prices, and it was more than twenty years later before Kruiz-
enga (1956), stimulated by some work of Samuelson, used methods 
similar to Bachelier’s to evaluate put and call options. (1964, 5)
After Cowles’ work in the 1930’s, there was little or nothing published 
along these lines until Kendall’s 1953 paper. . . . The publication in 
1959 of both Roberts and Osborne papers marked the beginning of 
the sharp recent increase in interest in this subject, by bringing it to 
the attention of the American academic audience for the first time 
since Cowles’ articles in the thirties. (1964, 81–82)
According to Cootner, the history of financial economics starts in 1900 
with Louis Bachelier. He is credited with having suggested for the first 
time the modeling of stock prices by a random walk. Then, Working, 
Cowles, and Kendall tested the random walk hypothesis between 1933 
and 1956. However, it was the articles of Roberts and Osborne published 
in 1959 that really stimulated interest in these problems. The first statis-
tical study was Moore’s, in 1962. Cootner summarized in this way the 
two first steps of the history of financial economics. The following step, 
which occurred during the 1960s, was the reexamination of the random 
walk hypothesis. Cootner used several articles to point out three kinds 
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27. For instance, see Granger 1965, King 1965, Markowitz 1965, Weiss 1966, Beals 1966, 
and Rosett 1968.
of problems, the normal distribution, the independence of stock prices, 
and the stationary character of the process:
Most of the work that follows the Moore paper stresses, in one way or 
another, the deviation of stock prices from the Einstein-Wiener pro-
cess. The Alexander-Larson-Cootner-Steiger papers all question the 
independence hypotheses. The Fama-Mandelbrot material questions 
the assumption of Gaussian increments. The Osborne paper examines 
the stationarity of the process. In raising these questions it was neces-
sary to invent subtle new tests, or to apply more esoteric probability 
distribution theory. (Cootner 1964, 189)
This presentation in three steps justified the works developed at MIT, 
which aim to identify correlations in security prices: the random walk 
model had been a roughly formed first hypothesis that had to be improved.
Cootner’s introductions also gave the first historical elements of the 
presentation of the past as well as the first canonical history. The elements 
of these introductions are reprinted in many other books and articles and 
had a great influence during the 1960s. Their influence can be seen in the 
reviews of Cootner’s book that were published in the most important 
American journals between 1965 and 1968.27 The reviews used Cootner’s 
introductions extensively and, therefore, helped circulate the historical 
data that became popular.
The canonical history provided by the Chicago viewpoint. Economists at 
the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business used historical 
data from Cootner’s book, but they elaborated another canonical history, 
which is mainly found in Fama 1965a, Fama 1970, and Lorie and Ham-
ilton 1973. The goal of this canonical history was to defend the random 
walk model. More precisely, it was constructed to impress upon read-
ers the triumph of the model. Therefore, it described a linear history that 
focused on tests. Fama’s articles provide a good illustration. Fama wants 
to build a testable theory although his definition of efficient market “has 
no empirically testable implications” (1970, 384).
Therefore, in his three articles (1965a, 1965b, 1970), Fama kept the 
same structure: the first part deals with theoretical implications of the 
random walk model and its links with the efficient market hypothesis, 
while the second part presents empirical results that validate the random 
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walk model. This sequence—theory then empirical results—is nowa-
days very familiar. It constitutes the hypothetico-deductive method, the 
scientific method defended in economics since the middle of the twenti-
eth century. Then, Fama linked the historical data with a methodologi-
cal perspective: he used the historical data that he did not discard to 
suggest that the efficient market hypothesis would be successfully vali-
dated. Thus, the canonical history that arises from Fama gave the fol-
lowing presentation: the origin of the random walk model/efficient the-
ory; the first generation of empirical tests; then, the second generation of 
empirical tests that also constituted a future program of research.
In his thesis, Fama (1965a, 41) gave a short presentation of the history 
of the random walk model in financial economics:
The first complete development of a theory of random walks in security 
prices is due to Bachelier, whose original work first appeared around 
the turn of the century. Unfortunately his work did not receive much 
attention from economists, and in fact his model was independently 
derived by Osborne over fifty years later. The Bachelier-Osborne model 
begins by assuming that price changes from transaction to transaction 
in an individual security are independent, identically distributed ran-
dom variables.
This would be the origin of the random walk model, which Fama called 
the Bachelier-Osborne model. Then, Fama pointed out that the first tests 
were not satisfactory:
Although Osborne attempted to give an empirical justification for his 
theory, most of his data were cross-sectional and could not provide an 
adequate test. Moore and Kendall, however, have provided empirical 
evidence in support of the Gaussian hypothesis. (42)
In his 1970 article, he added:
Kendall’s conclusion had in fact been suggested earlier by Working 
[1934], though his suggestion lacked the force provided by Kendall’s 
empirical results. (390)
In 1970, Fama introduced three forms of efficiency: the weak form, the 
semi-strong form, and the strong form. Following this presentation, Fama, 
Lorie, and Hamilton classified works according to the form of efficiency 
they tested. However, they only dealt with results that validated the random 
walk model.
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28. It must be kept in mind that the random character of stock prices does not automati-
cally validate the efficient market theory.
We can notice that this presentation seems close to Cootner’s book, 
which was the main source used by Fama. However, there are two impor-
tant differences in Cootner: on one hand, the place given to efficiency and, 
on the other hand, that given to the tests. The methodological perspective 
adopted in Fama’s history suggested a linear history that strengthens the 
idea of the random character of the triumph of stock prices: each time a 
result invalidated that hypothesis, authors from Chicago provided a coun-
terexample against the result. This methodological perspective created 
continuities between authors or empirical investigations but the continu-
ities were ad-hoc constructions and they were not compatible with histori-
cal data. For instance, the term “Bachelier-Osborne model” suggested a 
continuity that did not exist because Osborne did not know Bachelier’s 
work when he published his article. We have exactly the same thing with 
the empirical tests and investigations presented in the first part.
3. Concluding Comments
A final observation must be made. If we analyze ideas defended in text-
books and scientific journals, we must admit that since the 1970s, it is the 
efficient market theory that has been most widely disseminated, and can be 
considered as having won the theoretical battle: witness the assimilation—
although theoretically contestable; see Jovanovic 2003a—of the random 
walk model and market efficiency. It is not the goal of the present article 
to explain either the reasons for this victory or its theoretical consequences. 
However, with the triumph of the efficient market theory, the canonical 
history of the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business has been 
widely spread in scientific journals and in textbooks. It has been pre sented 
or extended by Bernstein (1992), Walter (1996, 2002), Mer ton (1998), 
Scholes (1998), Dimson and Mussavian (1999, 2000), and Whelan, Bowie, 
and Hibbert (2002), among others. It is, however, important to recall two 
points.
First, a large majority of contemporary tests validate the random char-
acter of stock price movements or returns.28 But what was the situation 
during the 1960s and before? Houthakker and Williamson (1996) tested 
the random character of stock prices during three periods: January 1969 
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29. The three periods coincided with fundamental changes in transaction costs, which can 
prevent informed investors from fully using their information: in 1975, fixed commissions 
were abolished; and in 1982, stock index futures were introduced, which was tantamount to a 
further reduction in transaction costs. However, as Houthakker and Williamson (1996, 136) 
clarified, while these changes in transaction costs were consistent with the evolution of effi-
ciency, this link does not prove that markets became more and more efficient because trans-
action costs were reduced.
30. On Fisher’s financial work, see Dimand 2004.
31. We can note that Samuelson had known of Bachelier’s work at the end of the 1930s 
(Taqqu 2001, 26). However, before the Second World War, no American school of mathemat-
ics existed. Therefore, although Bachelier’s work was known by some American mathemati-
cians, it was not disseminated systematically. On the dissemination of Bachelier’s work, see 
Jovanovic 2004 and Taqqu 2001.
32. For instance, in December 1922 at the meetings of the Mathematical Association of Amer-
ica, Arne Fisher used Bachelier’s formulas to resolve financial problems (Cairns 1923, 97).
to June 1975; July 1975 to June 1982; and July 1982 to June 1992.29 They 
showed that “the stock market, as measured by the S&P 500, did not follow 
a random walk during the first two periods but did so in the third period. In 
other words, the market became more efficient over the years” (136). They 
added, “It is somewhat ironic that in the 1970s, when the EMH [efficient 
market hypothesis] gained widespread acceptance, there were significant 
departures from a random walk. Fortunately for financial theory—and for 
the functioning of our capital markets—the market now conforms closely 
to a random walk. Reality has caught up with theory” (136). Therefore, 
empirical tests were not the main element that led to the adoption of the 
efficient market theory and the random character of stock market prices. 
This observation has an important implication: during the 1960s, MIT 
economists gave a better description of these movements; however, the 
history they defended was not the one retained.
Second, considering the number of publications and the content of text-
books, we note that the efficient market theory triumphed. This triumph, 
and with it the wide acceptance of the canonical history defended by the 
CRSP, has left forgotten many authors and contributions that do not enter 
into the framework of that history—for instance, Jules Regnault and Irving 
Fisher.30 The canonical histories analyzed here also obscured the fact that 
Anglo-American mathematicians had known Bachelier’s mathematical 
works since the 1910s, although they did not use them often.31 The Calcul 
des probabilités, published in 1912, gave to Bachelier international recog-
nition in the mathematics community, and some Anglo-American mathe-
maticians used Bachelier to answer financial problems.32
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Beyond these theoretical and historical questions, this article has shown 
that financial economics became a scientific discipline during the 1960s 
thanks to the creation of a new community of researchers and to the link-
ing of empirical and mathematical anterior results with economic con-
cepts and theories. However, the fight between two theoretical viewpoints 
marked the integration of financial economics into science. This article 
has demonstrated that to defend their theoretical viewpoints, each group 
created its own representation of the past of their discipline, that is, their 
own canonical history. The representations of the past of the discipline 
were weapons in the theoretical fights.
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